Frederick Townsend Ward is one of those American adventurers I would have liked to have a drink or two with. He led an exciting and adventurous life. He is also the founder of China post 1 the American legion post for mercenaries in exile. As a Former soldier, Kentucky colonel, Son of the American legion, and heraldic recipient of the Royal order of the red sash and the
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States. I would consider it an honor to be a member of China post 1. I have been in contact with the members in bagio city in the Philippines and I hope to go there and meet with them so they can verify my military service.
See you on the trail!
Tomahawk
(November 29, 1831 – September 22, 1862) was an American sailor and soldier of fortune known for his military service in
Imperial China during the
Taiping Rebellion.
Early life and education
Ward was born in
Salem, Massachusetts
on November 29, 1831. Ward was rebellious in his youth, so his father
removed Ward from school in 1847 and found him a position as second mate
on the
Hamilton, a
clipper ship commanded by a family friend.
Another version is that Ward demanded to leave school.
Life at sea proved difficult. Ward was given authority over many “old
salts”. He was thrown overboard after complaints that he gave too many
orders for a youth.
Captain William Allen recalled that Ward possessed traits of “reckless daring”, but was on the whole a valuable officer.
On the
Hamilton, Ward sailed from New York to
Hong Kong in 1847, but probably saw little beyond the port city because the
Qing Dynasty forbade foreigners from venturing inland (
Hong Kong Island had become a British Crown Colony in 1842, at the end of the
First Opium War).
In 1849 Ward enrolled at the “American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy”, now
Norwich University,
in Vermont, where the curriculum included military tactics, strategy,
drill, and ceremonies. He attended for only a few months, before he left
school and never returned. In 1850 he shipped out as first mate of the
clipper ship
Russell Clover. His father was the captain.
Frederick Townsend Ward in the 1850s
- 1850 First Mate, clipper ship Russell Clover, New York to San Francisco. Visits Gold Fields (?) Meets Giuseppe Garibaldi in Panama or Peru (?)
- 1851 First Mate, trading barque, San Francisco & Shanghai. Sailor, coastal cargo ships, China coast
- 1852 Sailor, coastal cargo ships, China coast, First Officer (XO), cargo ship Gold Hunter, carrying coolie labor to Mexico. Debarks in Tehuantepec, Mexico. Meets William Walker, joins Walker forces as filibuster.
- 1853 Part of Walker's Sonora Filibuster Invasion of Mexico, resigns sometime in 1853 or 1854, remains in Mexico
- 1854 Mexico, scrap metal business. Venture fails, travels to San Francisco by mule. First Mate, Westward Ho!
clipper ship, San Francisco – New York – Hong Kong. Refuses to
filibuster for Taiping's (?) Manchu Government unwilling to employ
Westerners. Ward returns to New York, enlists in French Army, Enters
Crimean War
- 1855 Ward in Crimean War, allowed to resign after insubordination to superior
- 1856 Whereabouts unknown
- 1857 China, First Mate on coastal steamship Antelope
- 1858 Mercenary for Juarez in Mexico(?) Texas Ranger (?)
- 1859 New York City, clerk in father's shipping agency office.
Travels to San Francisco en route to Shanghai (accompanied by brother
Harry)
- 1860 Arrives in Shanghai, (never to return to United States). XO on the Confucius, armed pirate suppression river steamer. Commander, Foreign Army Corps.
Filibustering
Aside from working as a sailor during the 1850s, Ward found employment, as a “
filibuster”.
“Filibustering” is “raising private mercenary armies and leading them
into other countries to advance either [one's own] schemes or those of
wealthy sponsors”.
Ward worked for the infamous “King of the Filibusters”,
William Walker, in Mexico, where he learned how to recruit, train, and command mercenary troops.
Ward also learned to avoid some of Walker's practices and behaviors.
Walker has a reputation for being “excessively vain, weak minded and
ambitious… his weakness renders him cruel…”
During Ward's later time in China, he displayed respect and concern for
the Western and Chinese troops under his command, whom he referred to
as “my people”.
Ward learned about practical warfare during his “filibusteresque”
experience in 1854 and when he served as a lieutenant with the French
Army in the
Crimean War. He learned about weapons, tactics, using riflemen in mobile platoons rather than in fixed firing lines and siege techniques.
Ward also learned that the frontal assault was of limited value against
disciplined long range firepower, and he gained experience under fire.
He did not serve throughout the entire war, because he was 'allowed' to
resign after being insubordinate to a superior officer.
In 1857, Ward sought work as a mercenary, but when he didn't secure
such work, he served as the first mate on a coastal steamship in
dangerous waters. He worked as a shipping agent in his father's
New York City office alongside his brother in 1859.
Shanghai newcomer
According to a contemporary account written in early 1862, Ward and his brother arrived in
Shanghai,
China in 1860 for the purpose of trading, perhaps as an extension of
their father's New York office. This may be true, but given Ward's
activities in the 1850s it is almost certain that Ward had ulterior
motives for his return. We can be sure he had little respect for the
Shanghai business practices, which he dismissed as “lying, swindling and
smuggling”.
Their arrival coincided with a buildup of Taiping forces in the area.
While Ward's brother set up a trading business in Shanghai, Ward
himself took up customary employment as the executive officer on the
Confucius,
an armed riverboat commanded by an American, employed by the “Shanghai
Pirate Suppression Bureau”. The Bureau was organized by Xue Huan and Wu
Xu, Shanghai governmental officials who took pains to shield explicit
imperial association with Western mercenaries and military, and
primarily funded by Yang Fang, a prominent Ningbo banker and
mercantilist.
Ward's show of bravery and initiative on board the
Confucius
reflected great credit upon him, and the prominent men of Shanghai took
notice. His exploits, previous military experience, ability to rise
above racism and empathize with local populations, and his stated
mercenary intentions, made him an attractive candidate to lead a force
of foreign nationals in defense of Shanghai against encroaching Taiping
forces.
Wu Xu and Yang Fang both increasingly recognized that such a force
was necessary, as Imperial forces, frequently staffed by Confucian
scholars and conscripts, rather than experienced commanders and
soldiers, had all too often proven unequal to the task of defeating
Taiping forces.
Through their contacts with the Western business community, and
Ward's own relentless self-promotion, in the spring of 1860 Wu and Fang
reached out to Ward and became his employers. Ward then began scouring
the wharves of Shanghai for every Westerner, sober or otherwise, capable
of firing a weapon. With this, the “Shanghai Foreign Arms Corps” was
born, which in defeat, would form the nucleus for the “
Ever Victorious Army”.
Shanghai Foreign Arms Corps
In 1860, both Chinese and Westerners would place more faith in a
small, motley group of mercenaries than readily available local
citizenry, because the average Chinese of the time had little
understanding of marksmanship, nor much impetus to defend the Manchu
throne. Further, with Taiping armies edging closer to Shanghai, there
was no time to train native peasants in either conventional Chinese or
Western warfare.
On the Shanghai docks, however, Westerners with diverse military
experience existed as “discharged seamen, deserters, and other drifters
who made Shanghai their temporary home, and even the gainfully employed
could be tempted by the prospect of adventure, high pay, and loot.”
This weapon, already forged, was used by Ward against the Taipings,
with the backing of local Shanghai ministers and merchants, in a highly
charged political atmosphere in which the Manchu Imperial forces had no
desire to show their reliance upon Western powers. By the same token,
the diplomats and military men of the Western powers discouraged foreign
involvement in domestic Chinese matters, even by Westerners in Chinese
employ. The Western powers’ concerns did not relate to principle – they
were most concerned about the power of the Taipings to block trade
downriver from the interior to Shanghai if neutrality were violated.
By June 1860, Ward had a polyglot force of 100 Westerners, trained in the best small arms (including
Colt revolvers)
and rifles available for purchase in Shanghai. Protesting that his
forces were not fully trained, Ward was forced by his Shanghai backers
to take his men into action alongside Imperial forces probing Taiping
advances, retaking two captured towns. They were then forced by
circumstances (and the urging of their Shanghai backers) to assault the
Taiping occupied and fortified city of Songjiang, without
artillery – a near-impossible task.
The attack failed, sending the thoroughly defeated force back to
Shanghai. However, by mid-July, Ward had recruited additional Westerners
and over 80
Filipino
"Manilamen", and purchased several artillery pieces, and once again,
his forces assaulted Sung-Chiang (松江). They were successful, but at
enormous cost. Out of a force of roughly 250 men, 62 were killed, and
100 were wounded, including Ward himself.
Ward and his forces now gained a notoriety that attracted new
recruits (for the pay was attractive, even if looting was discouraged by
Ward), and enraged local Westerners who saw Ward as an inflammatory,
filibustering element sure to force the Taipings to stop the flow of
trade. More disconcertingly, the Taipings themselves were now aware of a
new and potent force against them.
On August 2, 1860, Ward led the Foreign Arms Corps against Chingpu
(上海青浦), the next town from Sung-chiang on the approaches to Shanghai,
and this time the Taiping were prepared. As the Corps stormed a garrison
wall, Taiping forces lying in ambush waited for the optimum moment and
then delivered a withering barrage of close-range musket fire. Within 10
minutes, the Foreign Arms Corps had suffered 50% casualties, and Ward
himself was shot in the left jaw, with an exit wound in the right cheek,
scarring him for life and leaving him with a speech impediment.
The force retreated and Ward returned to Shanghai for medical
treatment and to attempt to recruit more forces and buy additional
artillery. Within several days he and the remnants of the Foreign Arms
Corps laid siege to Chingpu and bombarded it with artillery. By this
time, the Taiping's best military leader
Li Xiucheng
(李秀成), called Zhong Wang (忠王) or “The Faithful King”, dispatched 20,000
troops downriver to break the siege, sending the Foreign Arms Corps
fleeing back to the Songjiang area, where Ward's second-in-command,
Henry Andres Burgevine (another American fortune seeker), held the Corps briefly together, but it soon "ceased to function as an organized entity"
Ward returned to Shanghai for further treatment of his injury, and
was there while the Zhong Wang's forces laid siege, and were beaten back
by Western and Imperial forces within the City. Ward left Shanghai
(apparently secretly) in late 1860 for further treatment of his facial
wound, while the remnants of the Corps remained more or less under the
command of Burgevine. [After Ward's death, Burgevine briefly took
command of the force, but could not get along with his Imperial Chinese
superiors and struck Yang Fang, whereupon Burgevine was relieved of
command; he later went over to the Taiping rebels. In 1865, Burgevine
was arrested by Imperial officers and died in a drowning accident.
It is unclear as to whether Yang was still funding the Corps in the
late fall of 1860, but upon Ward's return in the spring of 1861, Ward
was able to attract desired elements of the Corps back to his employ.
After his return, Ward tenaciously began to recruit and train
replacements for the Foreign Arms Corps, offering terms attractive
enough to cause desertion among the many British warships in port. Ward,
facing arrest and numerous political difficulties arising from the
Western governments’ desire to remain neutral, opted to become a Chinese
subject, stymieing efforts by the British navy and other Western forces
to stop him.
In May 1861, Ward once again led the Foreign Arms Corps into battle
at Chingpu, and once again, the assault failed, with heavy casualties.
This was the last major engagement of the Foreign Arms Corps in its
“primarily Western” configuration.
Judgments as to the effectiveness of the Foreign Army Corps vary
depending upon the sympathies of the author. The most recent Ward
biographer,
Caleb Carr,
seems fairly generous in his estimation of Ward's accomplishments in
his 1992 work. However, perhaps the most authoritative judgment was
rendered by Richard J. Smith, who stated:
“Repeatedly sent into the field without adequate preparation by
Ward's frantic sponsors, the poorly trained and ill-disciplined
contingent stood virtually no chance of success against Li Xiucheng's
seasoned troops. Sometimes drunk and always disorderly, the Foreign-Arms
Corps depended primarily on the element of surprise and the superiority
of Western weapons to obtain victory.”
Ward clearly recognized the harsh truth of this statement. He soon
embarked upon a new scheme, in which he would reform the more reliable
elements of the Corps into the nucleus of an effective fighting force,
composed primarily of local Chinese.
Commander of the Ever Victorious Army
Credit for the concept of training Chinese in Western military
tactics and arming them with the best available weaponry is sometimes
given to Ward, other times to
Li Hongzhang,
a local Imperial commander “ordered to cooperate with — and keep an eye
on — Ward's unruly contingent” and other times to Burgevine, who
according to some began the training while Ward was recuperating, having
been inspired by the sight of a Chinese gun crew acting under French
direction.
Perhaps another factor in the reconsideration of local Chinese troops
was the changing mood of the local peasantry. Where before they had
been unwilling to fight for Manchu primacy, they were now constantly
threatened and in some cases occupied by Taiping forces that were,
despite their “heavenly” origin, ruthless in their treatment of local
populations. Indeed, in many cases informal militias were formed to
drive Taiping forces out, and conduct guerilla operations.
Regardless of the concept's true origin, Ward became its champion and
after his untimely death, no other commander could quite repeat his
success. Ward's decision to turn to local Chinese forces would ensure
his place in history, and help to end the
Taiping rebellion.
By the summer of 1861, a training camp was established by Xue Huan's “right hand man”
Wu Xu
(吳煦) at Song Chiang (松江), where Ward set up operations. Working with
the best of the survivors of the Foreign Arms Corp, and supported by a
strong Headquarters staff, Ward trained an increasing number (see below)
of Chinese in western small arms, gunnery, tactics, customs and drill
and ceremonies. Particular care was taken to train the Chinese to hold
their fire until their targets were within effective range. Chinese
troops, both Taiping and Imperial, “had a lingering faith… in the
intimidating power of noise”.
He even trained them to respond to western bugle calls and verbal
commands, and most strikingly, outfitted them in Western-style utility
uniforms, color-coded for branch of arms (
Infantry or
Artillery), with Indian “
Sepoy”
style turbans. This garb, at first distressing to the Chinese troops,
earned them the nickname “Imitation Foreign Devils” among the local
populace, as well as a fair share of mockery. In time, as the troops
proved themselves the equal of their European counterparts, both on the
parade ground and the battlefield, their distinct uniforms would become a
point of pride.
Another point of pride was their pay, which was both high and
consistent by Chinese standards – a strong recruiting drive that
triumphed over most discomfort with unfamiliar uniforms. The pay was
high in part to attract new recruits to dangerous work, but also to
compensate for the lack of “looting” opportunity. Ward strongly
discouraged looting, as he knew the practice turned local populaces
against their “liberators”. Other benefits offered to Ward's men
included better rations, billets, and of course, better chance of
survival in combat.
By January 1862, with about one thousand Chinese soldiers trained and
ready, Ward stated that his unit was ready for the field – much to the
relief of his Shanghai backers, particularly Yang Fang, who had
significantly invested both government and private funds into the
force's recruitment, arms and supplies. This was timely, as within the
same month, the Chung Wang's forces reentered that region with over
120,000 troops, in an attempt to first cut off, and then enter and
occupy Shanghai.
Ward, ever hungry for glory and no doubt seeking redress for his
facial injury, welcomed the conflict, and was absolutely confident in
his troops' ability to defend his Songjiang headquarters, while
simultaneously operating as “flying columns” to be directed to strategic
areas and Taiping vulnerabilities. He soon had several opportunities to
test this confidence.
In the middle of January, about 10 miles north of Shanghai in
Wu-Sung, and over 25 snow-covered miles from their own headquarters,
Ward lead his new army into action, under a banner carrying a Chinese
rendering of his own name reading “HUA” (華, 华). His forces drove the
Taipings from their entrenched positions, despite greater rebel numbers.
A week later, after a return march, Ward's forces struck at the city of
Guangfulin, occupied by over 20,000 Taiping troops, just five miles
from Ward's own headquarters.
Ward, at the head of five hundred men, attacked the city without
artillery support. The defenders, seeing the strange attire, military
skill and foreign leadership of their own countrymen, wavered and “were
filled with dismay and fled precipitately”
In February, again facing Taiping forces moving near his training
area, Ward took five hundred troops and in joint operations with local
Imperial commanders, drove the rebels from Yinchipeng, Chenshan,
Tianmashan, and other areas around Songjiang.
In the course of these actions against superior numbers, thousands of
Taiping were killed or wounded, while Ward himself suffered five wounds,
including the loss of a finger to a musket ball.
Li Xiucheng, enraged at this foreign irritant, had a force of 20,000
attack Songjiang, defended only by Ward's force of about 1,500 men. Upon
approach, rebel forces came under the fire of camouflaged artillery and
lost over 2,000 men. Immediately thereafter infantry struck out of the
city at the rebels, and cut off and captured another 800, while
capturing a large number of boats bearing Taiping supplies and arms.
The Taipings beat a hasty retreat, rather than lay siege to such a
hornet's nest. It was this moment, perhaps, that secured Ward's
reputation among all the people of the Shanghai area; Chinese, Western
and Taiping alike. From this moment on, the key Western commanders and
politicians would support him, funds for troops would flow relatively
freely from Imperial coffers, and his decisions would no longer be
second-guessed by his backers in Shanghai.
By March 1862, Ward's force would be officially named by the Qing government, and to history, as “The
Ever Victorious Army”, and Ward himself would be made first a 4th-rank, and then a 3rd-rank
mandarin, high honors from the Manchu court for a "barbarian".
Through the course of 1862, “The Ever Victorious Army” (常勝軍); would
essentially live up to its name, again and again defeating numerically
superior opponents, often in entrenched positions. Further, its presence
on the battlefield and example of effective Chinese soldiering served
as a “force multiplier” for Imperial Anhui units commanded by Li
Hongzhang, between whom and Ward mutual respect grew during joint
operations.
During the summer, Ward's “
duckfoot”
background found immediate application to the problems of land warfare.
The Chung Wang's growing Taiping forces in the area led to multiple
threats at multiple points across the region. Clearly, mobility was
needed for Ward's limited forces, but the road system was inadequate.
While another commander might have tried to solve the problem through
additional wagons and horses, Ward saw the rivers and canals
criss-crossing the region not as obstacles, but as passageways. He
quickly secured the use of several river steamers, fitted them out as
mobile artillery and troop transports, and increased his army's
effectiveness several times over. Li Xiucheng himself later “attributed
his defeats in the
Suzhou
area to Western steamers. Taiping land forces could contend with
"foreign devils", he believed, but rebel water forces could not.”
Throughout this time, Ward's reputation continued to grow. Ward
himself, outwardly caring little for public adulation, still sought to
quench some inner need for further glory, and hoped to participate in an
eventual strike against Nanjing, the Taiping capital, but this would
not be. The Manchu court, suspicious of Ward from the beginning, grew
even more concerned that as time passed, he refused to shave his
forehead, wear a queue or even appear in his fine Mandarin robes. These
and other comments regarding his ambitions led the court to limit the
size of his unit far beneath his potential to recruit for it, and to
give Ward far less rein than they would have to a commander with more
Confucian leanings.
By September, the Ever Victorious Army would number over 5,000 men,
organized in four battalions as well as an artillery corps, with several
riverboats used for transport and mobile artillery.
Ward's army - troop strength over time
- June 1860 100 Foreign mercenaries, (no artillery at this time)
- July 1860 250 Foreign mercenaries, artillery present from this date on
- August 1860 200+ Foreign mercenaries, severe casualties, perhaps 50% effective
- December 1860 Corps inactive (and unpaid?) while Ward absent
- May 1861 200+ Foreign mercenaries, severe casualties
- June 1861 50+ Foreign mercenaries, Chinese training camp established
- July 1861 150 Chinese + foreign officers
- October 1861 400 Chinese + foreign officers
- November 1861 Officially 430 Chinese + foreign officers, Spence states perhaps 3,000 more in actuality + armed riverboats & transports
- January 1862 1,000 Chinese + foreign officers
- May 1862 3,000 Chinese + foreign officers
- September 1862 5,000 Chinese + foreign & Chinese officers
Sources – Carr, Smith, Spence
Death in battle
Ward's tombstone in Taiping Kingdom History Museum
Ward was mortally wounded in the
Battle of Cixi, about 10 miles from
Ningbo on September 21, 1862, when he was shot in the abdomen.
One version is that he was wounded at the base of the city wall. Ward survived 14 previous battlefield injuries.
Ward lingered for a day. During that time he dictated a will ensuring
his brother, sister and Chinese wife would be cared for; he expired on
the morning of September 22, 1862. Ward died at the height of his fame,
leaving an unusual, original army forged by an even more unusual
commander.
Legacy
Just as the events of the American Civil War overshadowed Ward's
accomplishments in China during his life, his reputation after his death
was overshadowed by
Charles George Gordon,
aka "Chinese Gordon", a British Army officer. After Ward's death, the
command of the Ever-Victorious Army passed to his second in command,
E. Forrester,
Henry Andres Burgevine
and later to Gordon. Gordon biographers diminish or disregard that Ward
creation, the Ever Victorious Army, an original and unique military
development which made Gordon's famed success in China possible. Today,
Chinese Gordon is remembered, while Ward is largely forgotten. Some of
Gordon's fame is due to his dramatic death in
Khartoum years after the Taiping Rebellion.
There have been several books on Ward and the Ever Victorious Army by
Ward's contemporaries and biographers published in the century since
his death that seek to acknowledge Ward's contributions. The bestseller,
The Devil Soldier (1992), by renowned historian and novelist
Caleb Carr, was optioned for a motion picture soon after publication. Actor
Tom Cruise and director
John Woo were developing a movie scripted by Carr, but the project was never completed. The plot of the film
The Last Samurai, produced in 2003, was inspired by the 1877
Satsuma Rebellion led by
Saigō Takamori, and to a lesser extent, by the stories of
Jules Brunet, a French army captain who fought alongside
Enomoto Takeaki in the earlier
Boshin War, and of Frederick Townsend Ward.
Physical remains and monuments
There are just two U.S. memorials to Ward, both in Salem, MA: a headstone at an
unfilled grave, and a collection of materials detailing his life and times by the
Essex Institute.
Caleb Carr explains that “Ward's remains were dug up, and his grave
site and shrine were destroyed and paved over. The whereabouts of Ward's
bones today are unknown. They have almost certainly been destroyed. A
plain headstone over a
cenotaph in Salem is the only memorial to this most noteworthy of nineteenth-century American adventurers.”
Ward is also remembered in a
Songjiang Roman Catholic Church, and in a
Nanjing
museum. One visitor wrote “The grave of Ward, a Protestant, revered as a
Chinese Confucian hero, with a temple in his honour, now lies under the
altar of a Roman Catholic church [built in 1982], whilst the land
itself is the property of the local Buddhist monastery in a Communist
state... Ward has not been forgotten in Songjiang and local memory still
has Ward's bones under the high altar of the Catholic church”.
Ward's accomplishments are documented in the
Taiping Rebellion Museum
in Nanjing. One visitor remarked “To my surprise I saw, in a museum in
Nanjing, a tribute to Ward — a large headstone bearing Ward's name, put
in place by the
American Legion on May 29, 1923.“
American Legion China Post One
American Legion China Post One, formed in 1919 one year after the "great war" and chartered by the
American Legion on 20 April 1920, was originally named the General Frederick Townsend Ward Post No. 1, China.
It is the only Post nominally headquartered in a Communist country, and has been operating in exile since 1948 — presently in
Fate, Texas.
